Procedural standards of participation have the capacity to structure and constrain the exercise of authority. Focusing on the way decisions are formed, this article argues that the depletion of such standards in processes of reception of trans-and international decisions within the EU potentially leads to situations of unrestrained authority and can constitute a challenge to the rule of law. It sets out the basis for a conceptual and normative analysis underpinning the argument that procedural standards of participation can be considered part of the rule of law.
motivation for compliance, as a means of adjusting to claims of legitimacy. 12 Second, in the examples referred in this article, these standards apply to procedures that lead to the adoption of regulatory decisions of general scope. Natural and legal persons are affected only indirectly insofar as such decisions bind or commit their authors and other decision-makers. The focus of the article is not due process guarantees depleted when the chain of intertwined decisions results in the exercise of direct authority over individuals impairing their fundamental rights, which would speak directly to the rule of law. 13 Next, once established that treating the depletion of procedural standards as a rule of law problem is conceptually possible, this approach has normative consequences.
Procedural standards ought to retain the capacity of procedural law to structure discretion and constrain the exercise of public authority, which results from the intertwinement of decisions that cross different legal and regulatory systems. This approach will require adjustments and variations to the procedural rules currently practiced. Finally, this capacity also requires a reconceptualization of the procedures through which such intertwinement operates, or at least of the external role of the actors involved. Instances of public authority emerge from the external links between procedures. Internationalized procedures are neither only European, national nor international. 14 They result from a cascade of intertwined decisions. For this reason, they ought not be seen in segmented terms, at the risk of impeding solutions that constrain such authority.
The argument that the depletion of procedural standards of participation can be a rule of law problem is developed in the first part of the article. The article begins by returning to the empirical analysis on which it is based in order to assess the extent to 12 Julia Black, Constructing and contesting legitimacy and accountability in polycentric regulatory regimes, 2 REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE 137, at pp. 144-151 (2008) . 13 The prominent example would be the reception in EU law of the UN Security Council resolutions establishing terrorist sanctions. That due process guarantees are an aspect of the rule of law is a common law perspective; it is however not unknown in the German conception of Rechtstaat and in the French construction of État de droit (see, e.g. Jacques Chevallier, L'ÉTAT DU DROIT, (Montchrestien, 5 th ed., 2010) pp. 14-16, 19, 30, 51-52. which internationalized decision-making procedures may lead to instances of unrestrained authority (Section 2). Unrestrained authority, if it is possible to establish it, refers only to the formation of decisions. Therefore, the article addresses only one of several ways in which discretion can be structured and authority constrained. Also in Section 2, the article crucially moves on to clarify the conceptual, methodological and normative premises that enable us to read the depletion of procedural standards of participation in the light of the rule of law. This is the starting point of a more detailed conceptual and normative analysis that establishes the basis to bridge the two terms of a prima facie odd equation -participation and rule of law -and indicates the reasons why they ought to be bridged (Section 3). The second part of the article outlines the normative consequences of reading the depletion of procedural standards as a rule of law problem. It argues that governance practices might need to be reinterpreted in legal terms, revealing also the limits of current EU procedures. In addition, it argues that, to the extent that the exercise of authority stemming from intertwined EU and international procedures is to be brought under the realm of law, the respective procedures need to be reconceptualized. The article suggests two possible routes: conceptualize them as composite procedures; emphasize the procedural duties of the EU institutions and bodies when acting in an external role (Section 4).
Framing the problem: A challenge to the rule of law

Two instances of depletion
Unrestrained public authority may occur insofar as international decisions received in the EU legal order are not subject to procedural constraints that would apply should such decisions be adopted internally, while by effect of reception they acquire the legal force that equivalent EU acts would have. 15 Let us start by revisiting two examples on which this argument is built in order to better assess the contours of the 15 As mentioned, the following analysis zooms in decision-making procedures and, specifically, rules and practices of participation, ignoring other possible mechanisms of control. 16 The examples are taken from Mendes, EU law and global regulatory regimes (supra note 2), where more detail is given. 17 Article VIII(1)(a), (2) . 20 At present, these representatives come mainly from the industrial fishing sector, but the on-going reform of the Common Fisheries Policy envisages modifications also in this respect, with a view to ensuring a balanced representation of all interests involved (article 52(1) of the Proposal cited note supra).
pursuing the public interests protected by the EU fisheries legislation. 21 Consultation is explicitly excluded in the case of regulations that transpose decisions of Regional
Fisheries Organizations, such as the ICCAT, and it is not compensated by the possibilities of participation of interest representatives in ICCAT decision-making procedures. 22 At least until recently, ICCAT's were mostly closed meetings, and
NGOs had difficulties in accessing information. 23 The absence of procedural constraints at the international level leads then to a closed decision-making procedure. In addition, this procedure is not subject to a requirement of consideration of, or justification towards, the range of legally protected interests, which would apply if the decision would be adopted internally. This is only part of the problem. The possibility of unrestrained authority does not result in isolation from the decisions adopted in inter-and trans-national regulatory fora. It results from the combination of lack of constraints in the law-making power of inter-and trans-national bureaucracies that would be adequate to decisions intended to become eventually binding on natural and legal persons, and from the side-stepping of procedural constraints to which domestic administrative decisionmakers would need to abide if that decision would be adopted internally.
Irrespective of how they are formed and received, such decisions could a posteriori be subject to judicial review by EU and domestic courts (in the absence of apposite instances of review at the international level stress "the fluidity of principles" that circulate different fields in evolving contemporary law, which, at the same time, reveals the "openness of law to principles stemming from other disciplines", but also constitutes "a fertile ground for speculations regarding global administrative law".
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Indeed, the legal character of participation is far from being a given. Several studies have highlighted the importance of participation (but also of transparency and accountability) in providing forms of democratic or legal legitimation (depending on the analysis) to certain inter-and trans-national regulatory regimes in the absence of state-like controls of democratic government. 46 But can procedural standards of participation be considered as part of law? Or by attributing to participation the ability to structure and constrain the exercise of public authority one is just dressing as law a phenomenon that effectively pertains to administrative practices, at the risk of providing them a veil of legitimacy they would otherwise not have? These are core questions to the argument of this article. Two aspects matter decisively in framing the discussion: first, the perspective from which one approaches participation, which defines this concept for the purposes of the current analysis; secondly, the methodological stance and normative premise that underpin this article. Both shape the two terms of the equation under analysis.
From a legal perspective, participation entails a set of procedural rules that ensure consideration and balancing of the interests affected by decision-making, and, as result, enhances the material justice of the decisions adopted. Material justice refers, in this context, to "the substantive quality of a decision that embodies a composition of interests which results from having taken in due consideration and having balanced the different public and private legally protected interests that the decision-maker is bound to take into account". 47 From this viewpoint, participation ought to be legally protected when such interests are themselves protected by the applicable law and, as such, need to be considered by the decision-maker in the balancing of options that precedes the adoption of a decision. If in a regulatory setting, such as the ones mentioned in the examples above, participation does not relate directly to the protection of rights for the lack of an adversarial-type situation, to be relevant from a legal point of view, it needs to relate to the protection of legally protected interests.
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From this perspective, this justifies that participation is intrinsically linked with justification. It affords legal protection insofar as the decision-maker is required to reason its decisions, not to a specific group of interest representatives, not to the network of peers by simply referring to the decisions they approved, but in the light of the law and of the legally protected interests it is bound to pursue or to respect.
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How far this understanding of participation matches the EU rules and practices of participation exemplified in the beginning of the article will be discussed below.
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Informing the current analysis is the deeper normative concern with law's capacity to extend beyond its traditional realm as well as beyond national borders, beyond inter-national law. 51 What follows builds on the methodological premise that traditional categories of (state) public law ought to be revisited and, to the extent possible, reconceptualized, with a view to capture the instances of exercise of public authority and address them with legal tools. 52 Arguably, this path ultimately allows identifying the elements in these regulatory spaces that can be captured by traditional categories of (state) public law, which inevitably will suffer a process of keep of the public law categories in the new regulatory contexts, and in which instances (admitting that not all processes of regulation occurring beyond the state will be able to be captured by law, or, at least, the advantages of doing so might not overcome the disadvantages).
This methodological standpoint is informed by a normative premise. Accepting that, at whichever level it is exercised, "public power stands in need of legitimation and limitation" 53 , this article proposes that some of the mechanisms that are already in place in inter-and transnational settings -set up to at least create the impression of a structured exercise of discretion and to lend a sense of legitimacy to the respective decisions -be re-interpreted in the light of the idea that the exercise of such authority ought to be constrained. This may require bringing those mechanisms into the purview of law, and, in turn, extending law -and possibly also the rule of law -into the realm of regulation and governance where it does not always sit comfortably. The purpose of this re-interpretation would be to address the tension between authority and autonomy, in the sense of respect for a private sphere of liberty and dignity, as it enfolds today outside state-like sites of law production and, in particular, in supra-, inter-and transnational spaces. Internationalized procedures, albeit resorting to alternative modes of regulation, and irrespective of their form, may ultimately put at stake the balance between the exercise of authority and the protection of liberty/dignity that has been at the core of public law instruments in the liberal constitutional state. This may occur to the extent that such processes risk leaving a wide purview of discretion in the hands of decision-makers, whose decisions are 53 Dieter Grimm, While these premises may bring us one step closer to establishing possible normative links between participation and the rule of law, they are still one step away from laying them down. Once established, those links will flesh out the role of procedural standards of participation as a means of structuring and constraining the exercise of authority and, specifically, of subjecting administrative actors to the laws that bind them when acting beyond the borders of their domestic jurisdictions.
The rule of law: does participation fit?
Rule of law…
The rule of law is a dynamic concept, 55 "a contingent legal theory". 56 In a late modern sense, it is the product of the legal-liberal traditions shaped in the political and institutional history of Britain, Germany, France and the US (namely, by the different conceptions of the State predominant in these countries in the 19 th and early 20 th centuries). Inevitably, the content of the rule of law is far from uniform and disagreement "extends to its core". 57 Each political context produced distinct political and doctrinal meanings and specific implications. 58 In one reading, the rule of law conveys the limitation of power by law to avoid tyranny and potential abuses and misuses. 59 Insofar as it translates as subjecting the executive power to respecting the law, this notion is arguably common to the different conceptions of the rule of law 54 Arguing that too much discretion is left in the hands of the executive when acting in its international role and on other consequences of leaving the external action of the executive unbounded, see Benvenisti, supra note 8, in particular pp. 184-201. 55 Chevallier, supra note 13, pp. 12, 140; Brian Tamanaha, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY (Cambridge University Press, 2004) p. 5. 56 Chevallier, supra note 13, p. 9. 57 Tamanaha, supra note 55, p. 3. 58 Contrasting essentially the meaning of "État de droit" and "Rechstaat", see Chevallier, supra note 13, 13-66. On different historical and theoretical constructions, but with a stronger emphasis on the Anglo-Saxon traditions, see Tamanaha, supra note 55, Chapters 3 to 8. 59 Tamanaha, supra note 55, pp. 114-5.
that developed in the main public law traditions of modern Europe. 60 This same idea has also become progressively under strain since the second half of the 20 th century. 61 Several qualifications have been added to this core idea of limitation of power: in a liberal tradition, the limitation of authority is inseverable from the protection of individual liberties and rights; 62 inspired by social democracy, the limitation of authority under the rule of law serves the preservation of human dignity, justice, and democracy. 63 Liberal conceptions tend to convey a formal meaning of the rule of law -stressing generality, prospectivity, stability and clarity as qualities rules ought to have under the paradigm of the rule of law. 64 Substantive conceptions, which emerged more predominately in the period that followed Western totalitarian experiences, underline the values that inform the law and are usually associated with the interventionist role law acquired in the welfare state. Formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law are, nevertheless, in a "symbiotic relationship". 65 This highly concise overview of possible different meanings of the rule of lawunsatisfactory in many respects -inevitably falls short of heeding the richness of two centuries of both political and legal theoretical reflection and historical evolution.
Including it in this article has however the purpose of supporting one argument: the content of the rule of law, being disputed, is also malleable. Or, more precisely, the core idea of the rule of law pointed out above -the limitation of power to ensure certain values (be it freedom, dignity, justice or democracy) -while having manifold implications, also entails the potential of the rule of law to adjust to changing realities.
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One may still rightfully argue that the rule of law "flourished in a certain ideological ground, rooted in a certain social and political reality; deprived of this substrate, cut off from its references, [the theory of the rule of law] appears only as an empty shell, a formal frame and becomes itself 'in-significant'". 67 This is a sound observation, which advises against too hasty extensions of the concept and theory.
Nevertheless, even if seen as "a fragment of a civilization", as a piece of an "ideological whole", 68 if kept purely within its historical state-centric context, the rule of law risks ignoring that the tension between authority, on the one hand, and autonomy that connotes a private sphere of liberty and dignity vis-à-vis the exercise of authority, on the other, has moved also to the transnational space, beyond the national and the inter-national spheres (and, within them, to sites of authority different from the state). It risks being "nullified by the process of transformation of the state", 69 and by the internal and external diffusion of power. From this perspective, without denying the relevance of also maintaining the rule of law within its less disputed realm -as referring to certainty, predictability and publicity, an independent judiciary, due process of law in courts, and, by extension, in administrative adjudicatory procedures, and other core features 70 -one would rather 66 Following a substantive conception of the rule of law, endorsed here, this argument needs to be qualified by an important normative caveat: the transformative capacity of the rule of law relies on the adaptability of its content, but this can neither deny the dignity of the human person nor the institutions and procedures that allow one to consider a society as democratic. See Rivero, supra note 60, 100-101. For a different view, see, inter alia, Joseph Raz The Rule of Law and its Virtue, 93 THE LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW, 194-211 (1977) , who is critical of conceptions of the rule of law that make it "signify all the virtues of the state" (198). 67 Chevallier, supra note 13, p. 50, author's translation. 68 Rivero, supra note 60, p. 101, author's translation. 69 Chevallier, supra note 13, p. 12. As mentioned, while this article focuses on internationalized administrative procedures, this reasoning also applies to transformations of public authority within the state (see supra note 52). 70 stress the "evolving nature" of the rule of law and, on this premise, inquire into its capacity to frame more recent transformations of public authority.
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For current purposes, the inquiry into the possible transformations of the rule of law focuses on procedural standards of participation and on a procedural meaning of the rule of law -one that zooms in law-generating processes and how they are constructed when initiated in inter-and transnational settings. In itself, this focus may be contentious. Analyzing law-generating processes rather than law-applying processes from the perspective of the rule of law may be criticized on the ground that the rule of law is not about the making of the law, but about its qualities and, if at all about process, then about processes of law application. 72 Yet, in the type of situations exemplified in the beginning of the article, the actors involved are at the same time law-makers and law-appliers and, in the former process, they condition the choices they follow in the latter. In addition, given the looser constraints of internationalized procedures, the limited judicial purview over the links between internal and external procedures and the virtual absence of public scrutiny of external regulatory activities, executive actors defining regulatory acts at the inter-and transnational level may more easily take biased decisions that have nonetheless a significant impact on internal law and on natural and legal persons. 
…and participation
The two poles mentioned -a procedural conception of the rule of law and participation -can be bridged by focusing on one of the core procedural principles of the rule of law (core, at least, in the common law world, but also, by English influence, in EU law): no one should be subject to a penalty or a serious loss resulting from unilateral public action without being given the opportunity to put forth their 71 Similarly, albeit drawing different implications from the argument, see Palombella, who stresses: "the ideal of the rule of law might also require different incarnations that are better suited to realizing its normative rationale against a background of changing social settings" (Gianluigi Pallombella, From another perspective, the principle mentioned above can be extended to cover participation in procedures leading to the adoption of general acts. 79 It does not translate merely into the right to be heard in adjudicatory procedures, but, arguably, it stresses more broadly "the value we place on government treating ordinary citizens with respect as active centers of intelligence", 80 irrespective of the form the action of public authority takes. 81 This is also in line with the idea of the person as bearer of fundamental rights: while subject to the exercise of public authority, the person must be treated in a way that respects him or her as a member of the collectivity and holder of rights. 82 Their dignity would be respected when the persons subject to authority are not treated merely as objects of decisions that interfere with their legal spheres. In this procedural reading, the rule of law "requires that public institutions sponsor and facilitate reasoned argument in public affairs". 83 Respect for dignity requires an opportunity for argumentation. 84 The freedom the rule of law protects is then a "positive freedom: active engagement in the administration of public affairs, the freedom to participate actively and argumentatively in the way one is governed".
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Arguably, pursuing it requires the subjection of public authority to legal rules that structure its exercise accordingly. In constraining decision-makers to engage with those who bear the effects of their decisions, these rules can ensure due consideration for the (individual, collective and diffuse) legally protected interests affected by public policy. 86 They thereby force decision-makers to consider the views voiced, to 79 Mendes, PARTICIPATION IN EU RULE-MAKING, supra note 38, pp. 58-70, 76-77, and 229-240. 80 Waldron, supra note 72, p. 22. 81 Mashaw points out that "as contemporary administrative acitivity (…) moves increasingly toward the use of generally applicable rules, a due process jurisprudence oriented to the protection of rights through adjudication, rather than toward the ways rights are created by quasi-legislative processes, appears impoverished" (Mashaw, supra note 48, p. 896). 82 These risks and potential disadvantages advise against all-encompassing solutions and point to the need to strike "delicate balances" in specific regulatory contexts, taking into account the different realities to which procedures would apply. 92 They do not, however, constitute a principled objection to the introduction of procedural rules of participation capable of upholding the rule of law, in the sense indicated above.
Using the image of concentric circles, one is certainly closer to the rule of law -in the procedural sense indicated above -when the act originating in the inter-and trans-national sphere is an individualized determination, the potential addressees of which, or affected persons, can easily be identified. It is this type of situations Waldron considered in his proposal for a procedural conception of the rule of lawthe opportunity to make arguments about what the law is and ought to be in cases where authority has a direct bearing on the person. 93 But, within certain conditions, the procedural conception of the rule of law proposed is capable of encompassing the participation of holders of rights and legally protected interests affected by general acts, that is, by law-making type of procedures. 94 These type of situations would then constitute an outer circle, where the exercise of authority does not have a direct bearing on individuals -an effect that will nevertheless occur via a follow up decision adopted elsewhere -but where the law is defined for more or less precise instances of regulation, with more or less detail regarding the specific entitlements and duties that emerge therefrom. 95 In between the core and the outer circle there may be potentially a great variety of situations.
In the outer circle, the possibility of harm being produced that may ultimately have a detrimental impact on individual legal spheres cannot be excluded. However, this is the point where the boundaries that could delimit a procedural conception of the rule of law, on the one hand, from a democracy argument that would ground the democratic legitimacy of decision-making on the search for the most adequate solution via an argumentative process, on the other, and also from participation as a governance principle, risks becoming blurred. At the same time, this is also the point from where on one can identify the situations in which the coordination between public and private actors that join efforts in decision-making procedures standing at the margins of law -or squarely falling outside its realmshould be subject to legal principles and rules inspired by a procedural conception of the rule of law. Would the subjection to procedural rules that structure the exercise of authority in such situations still be part of the rule of law? Already in the late 1970s, Raz argued:
Still rule of law?
"we have reached the stage in which no purist can claim that truth is on his side and blame the others of distorting the notion of the rule of law". 99 Participation can be, and is usually, defended on grounds different from the rule of law -transparency and participation of the public (democracy inspired argument), or as an instrument to achieve better regulatory outcomes that leaves the choices of participation fully in the hands of the decision-maker (governance). From a legal perspective, it is justified by the need to limit the exercise of authority due to the legal effects of the decisions adopted by a public authority. 100 Whether participation in the latter sense can be considered from a rule of law perspective, is debatable. One may argue that invoking the rule of law in this case may only amount to invoking the symbolic meaning of this principle. However, the above analysis shows that the purpose of making a rule of law claim is within the "rule of law ethos", if this is perceived as encompassing the protection of the dignity of the person and the material justice of public acts, in the sense proposed. Participation can ensure that the persons affected by decisions of public authority (irrespective of their form) are treated in their autonomy as members of a collectivity and holders of rights, rather than as objects of decisions that are alien to them. Insofar as this is the case, participation is a legal tool to structure and constrain the exercise of authority.
Returning to the examples mentioned in the beginning of this article, harm to legally protected interests that ultimately may have a detrimental impact on individual legal spheres can result from the regulatory cycles initiated by the adoption of ICH guidelines and of ICCAT recommendations. The procedures through which the initial decisions are adopted do not entail procedural guarantees that ensure the due consideration of the interests protected by the laws of the participating entities (in the case analyzed, the EU). As mentioned, they are later applied in the domestic legal order as adopted in inter-and trans-national fora, via decisions that concretize their legal effect in the legal sphere of those concerned, which in turn are adopted through 99 Raz, supra note 66, p. 196. 100 See supra Section 1.
procedures that also do not entail such guarantees. As an effect of the reception of inter-and trans-national decisions, the holders of the legally protected interests concerned may suffer harm as a result of unilateral public action (in this case, intertwined decision-making adopted at different levels of governance) without being given the possibility of -via interest representatives -putting forth their views, and without procedural guarantees that the legally protected interests they hold have been balanced by the decision-makers. At stake are interests that are legally protected in the EU also in the form of fundamental rights, the pursuance of which is dependent on technical and scientific issues such as those decided via internationalized rulemaking procedures. 101 From an objective perspective -that is, one that detaches from the individual situation of the persons affected -there is a dearth of procedural mechanisms that ensure that the discretion exercised via these regulatory processes is structured and authority constrained in a way that it complies with the law to which administrative entities are bound, while the legal effects of their decisions in legally protected interests are potentially significant. Arguably, this result contradicts the values conveyed by the rule of law, as approached above.
It is this aspect -the capacity of procedural standards to structure discretion and constrain the exercise of authority -that risks being depleted by the effect of the interaction of legal regimes. One problem with this construction is that also within the EU the procedural standards that are depleted as a result of reception are not legal guarantees. What would be depleted then? At first sight, procedural standards of participation established in the realm of governance, outside legal parameters stricto sensu, that only due to a stretch of imagination could possibly be read with a rule of law lens. Nevertheless, the procedural rules that allow for participation in the decision-making procedures analyzed can have the effect of structuring and, hence, limiting authority. Certainly, a concern for constraining authority is not the main reason why they were created in the first place. 102 However, the way they have developed -at least as far as this can be determined on the basis of written procedural rules enshrined in Commission Communications and agency's rules of procedure applicable in the cases mentioned -does not differ in essence from legally binding rules of notice and comment that would constrain the procedures to which they apply. 103 In this sense, they have at least the capacity of constraining the exercise of authority. This assertion neither means that they cannot be critically assessed in the light of this aim, improved to better ensure it, nor that this is actually the effect they have. On the contrary, it sheds a critical light also on the procedural rules followed within the EU. The difference between governance or administrative practices and legally binding procedures remains the origin of such rules and the consequences of non-compliance -voluntarily followed practices (self-constrain), in one case, externally determined legal rules that can be enforced via judicial review, in the other. Admittedly, not in all cases there are legal arguments to defend that the transition from one model to the other ought to be made. 104 At any rate, it is precisely this capacity that one cannot identify in the procedural rules that apply to decisionmaking procedures developed in the corresponding international and transnational spaces analyzed, to which substantive decisions are effectively transferred by effect of international agreements or international regulatory cooperation. They are weaker because, in one case, there is no legal determination according to which interest representatives should be consulted, and logically also no duty to take the views received into account, contrary to the EU procedural rules that would otherwise apply (fisheries); in the other case, there seems to be no concern regarding the feedback to be given to the participants neither public explanations on the options finally followed (medicines). The value of participation remains in the shade, since it is hardly possible for interested persons to assess how their contribution was treated, which in turn compromises the ability of the respective procedures to structure discretion and constrain the exercise of authority.
Procedural standards of participation (accompanied by guarantees of justification) may be as good as it gets in terms of structuring and constraining the exercise of 103 Mendes, idem, and PARTICIPATION IN EU RULE-MAKING, supra note 38, p. 370. 104 See the legal meaning of participation as characterized in Section 1 supra.
authority in areas of regulation where the role of law is unclear, whether they include the reception of international and transnational decisions or not. At stake is the limitation of authority that is characteristic of a legal system that purports to obey to the rule of law and that is concerned with structuring the discretion of administrative decision-makers. What one then misses (what is depleted) is one of the mechanisms that constrain decision-makers to justify their decisions in the light of the public interests they are legally bound to pursue.
The transformative potential of a rule of law inspired perspective: reconceptualizing decision-making procedures?
If the depletion of procedural standards of participation by effect of reception of decisions adopted within inter-and trans-national regulatory regimes can be perceived as a problem of rule of law, which consequences follow? Which adjustments and variations to the procedural rules that are practiced in transnational spaces would this perspective require? There are two different, but related aspects to this question. First, as implied above, approaching participation from the perspective of the rule of law requires reinterpreting processes and mechanisms that were introduced in decision-making with purposes that are far from an ideal of constraining authority or, even more so, from a concern of respecting "the freedom to participate actively and argumentatively in the way one is governed", to use again Waldron's terms. 105 It requires reinterpreting them in legal terms, transforming current practices into rules that would limit public authority, therefore, creating legality (or quasi-legality) where thus far it has not existed. consequences: a change in approaching the procedural standards that are currently in place, and a change in approaching the procedures where they apply.
The transformation of the procedural standards would occur along the lines indicated above. As argued, in instances where the exercise of public authority is at stake and, in addition, holders of the legally protected interests concerned may suffer harm as a result of unilateral public action, participation as a part of governance discourses and participation inspired by a rule of law perspective could and should be bridged. The decision-making procedure should entail guarantees that the decisionmakers duly balance the legally protected interests concerned. These may be legal guarantees, sanctioned by law, or may stem from institutional practices that, nevertheless, have the capacity of constraining the exercise of authority through means other than the law. The precise shape of these guarantees would depend on a variety of factors. 106 Moreover, the advantages of their introduction would need to be balanced against their possible disadvantages in the concrete regulatory settings at issue. 107 That claim points to the need to, at least, preserve the procedural standards that are capable of structuring the decision-makers' discretion, and hence, of constraining the authority they exercise when adopting general acts -the ones depleted as an effect of reception of international decisions. But it also indicates that the EU procedures themselves ought to be re-thought in the light of this conception, with a view to ensuring that self-imposed procedural rules may function as effective constraints, and do not merely coat decision-making with a veil of legitimacy.
This leads us to the second consequence mentioned. Advocating this transformation postulates also a new way of approaching procedures, for two reasons.
First, the transformation of procedural standards is defended in the adoption of acts that, irrespective of their source or form, entail the exercise of public authority. In the cases analyzed above, such instances can only be properly identified if one takes into account the external links of decision-making procedures. This point has been made above. 108 Second, if procedures continue to be viewed in segmented terms, i.e. only in their horizontal dimension, possible solutions to constraining the exercise of authority face considerable hurdles or are unsatisfactory, for the reasons explained next.
If one takes an horizontal view on internationalized procedures, separately analyzing their global and domestic (in our case, European) levels, the normative perspective defended above would lead to one of three possible claims: first, procedural standards that structure the administrative discretion and, hence, limit the exercise of authority, need to be introduced in international and transnational lawmaking procedures (centralized solution); second, and alternatively, when pursuing international activities, EU bodies and institutions ought to be bound, internally, by the same procedural rules that apply when there are no instances of reception (decentralized solution); thirdly, both solutions need to be followed (combined solution).
The centralized solution raises one important objection: the procedures currently in place in those regulatory fora may be adequate to the type of decisions that are therein adopted. As mentioned above, the problem of unrestrained authority may only emerge from the vertical effects of these decisions. Therefore, one may argue that the problem lies only down the regulatory chain, hence, it is a problem of how these decisions are received -in other words, a problem of the domestic legal systems. If at all, changes would be needed there. Should one still agree that the procedural standards practiced in international and transnational fora should be changed, it would follow from the normative perspective defended above that such standards would need to be constructed in a highly complex way. They would need to accommodate the legally protected interests of the legal orders of the participating members, and consider the possible harmful effects of their decisions in third countries that suffer the effect of the decisions adopted. The potential complexity of this solution could block decision-making, rendering it ultimately both unfeasible and undesirable.
The decentralized solution would be the suitable alternative, given that the problem lies in the domestic legal orders. It is the legal orders where the depletion of procedural guarantees may be problematic that would need to adjust their mechanisms of reception. But this solution is equally unsatisfactory. First, the argument overlooks that the domestic legal systems are either legally bound by the substantive decisions adopted externally, or simply follow them for reasons of administrative convenience. Introducing procedural guarantees at the moment of reception would very likely be a window-dressing exercise, since it would be incapable of impacting in any way on substantive decisions already adopted elsewhere. 109 Alternatively, it would place the domestic authorities in a difficult position, since they would face the possibility of needing to refuse reception (on legal grounds) if this would mean a deviation from their own law. The latter option is unrealistic. Domestic authorities in charge of reception are often the same that have made the external decisions they then receive (which does not mean they will duly consider the legally protected interests they are bound to respect internally).
Therefore, they will not be prone to setting aside the external decision, for procedural or substantive reasons. Domestic authorities will probably more easily use the argument that "unfiltered" reception (i.e. not subject to further internal procedural guarantees) is the result of their international duties, and compliance with the latter justifies that they do not follow procedures that would be practiced internally, as the example of reception of ICCAT decisions demonstrates. 110 The decentralized solution is unsatisfactory for a second, related reason. The insistence on a domestic -internal -perspective, if at all, can only solve problems of depletion of procedural guarantees within the domestic legal system (in our case, the EU). It only alerts to an internal problem of consistency, 111 in which case possible normative solutions following the views defended above would fail to address the problem of unrestrained authority in internationalized rulemaking. As pointed out, the challenge of creating adequate procedural guarantees may lay in the exit options that external regulatory fora provide, as the ICH example shows, or in the very approach of domestic authorities regarding their international role and obligations. 109 Similarly, albeit referring to accountability for individual decisions, see Carol Harlow, "Composite Decision-making and Accountability Networks: Some Deductions from a Saga", JEAN MONNET WORKING PAPER 04/12, pp. 27-28 (2012). 110 Mendes, EU law and global regulatory regimes, supra note 2, p. 1000. 111 This can work in opposite directions (see Mendes, EU law and global regulatory regimes, supra note 2, pp. 1003-4, 1008-9).
The combined solution is compromised by the fact that it would still rely on a multi-level approach, which, for the reasons stated above, is unsuitable to address the problem of unrestrained authority addressed in this article. It does not escape the problems of the centralized and of the decentralized solution, namely because it would follow an horizontal-segmented perspective on the decision-making occurring at each level, and, thereby, it would likely overlook the fact that the actors involved in the different regulatory stages may be the same using with "different hats". primarily to national rules of procedure, but also to EU law; those developed at the EU level are subject to EU rules of procedure. 122 Procedural rules that ensure participation tend to fall through the mesh that supports the administrative collaboration between national and EU administrations. 123 In the international and transnational sphere, when considering the interlinks between different legal systems and regulatory regimes outside integrated administrative structures, the possibility that constructing decision-making procedures as composite would have normative effects of the type envisaged here is even dimmer.
These difficulties and open questions do not deny per se the explanatory value of this approach. For the reasons indicated above, it can be a useful starting point to addressing the normative problems that emerge from internationalized procedures.
Using the lens of composite procedures highlights that structuring and constraining the exercise of authority may "entail a complex structure, capable of functioning at various levels (…) of including all the relevant actors (…) and of organizing various sub-sectors". 124 But it requires an analysis that cannot be further developed here. piercing inter-and transnational decision-making procedures. 126 Justification, as envisaged here, is important because reason giving creates the conditions for contestation and control, but it can also avoid treating the holders of legally protected interests merely as objects of decision-making. 127 Ultimately, the emphasis on procedural duties of EU institutions and bodies acting in an external role would structure their administrative discretion and avoid "exit ways" that could lead to instances of unrestrained authority. 128 This way of conceiving the external conduct of domestic administrative actors would be consequential externally. If applicable to domestic administrative actors of other jurisdictions gathered in inter-and transnational regulatory fora, the effect would be multiplied. It would then lead to a web of justification that enables legal and political control over the external role of those actors, in the light of the internal laws that bind them. Whether that would be capable of impacting on the procedures followed within those fora in a meaningful way is another matter. 129 Meaningful, from the normative perspective of this article, would mean finding an adequate way of structuring discretion and constraining authority in internationalized procedures, which would capture the vertical effects of inter-and transnational decisions.
Actors and their procedural duties
Addressing this point would need a deeper understanding of the functioning of these fora, of what it means for the participating members to act under the law, of how incompatible claims inherent to the laws of the participating members could be articulated and which consequences such articulation would entail. 130 However, it is plausible that, if internally constrained by duties of justification that link their external actions back to the substantive and procedural rules that bind them internally, these actors may be pressured also to adjust inter-and transnational decision-making procedures to comply with the same claims of legitimacy they face internally. 131 Internal procedural constrains regarding external regulatory actions of domestic actors could therefore contribute to transform inter-and transnational procedures, given the functional links of the respective decisions. While it would be impossible to accommodate all legitimacy claims stemming from the internal laws of the participating members, it is arguably unlikely that such claims would not have any impact upward in the regulatory chain. 132 Admittedly, the pull towards different procedural rules will most probably come from the most powerful actors in the interand transnational scene, eventually spurring criticisms of Americanization or Europeanization of procedures. 133 But this observation only timidly lifts the veil of the more complex factors and incentives that influence decision-making and the relations between actors within the varied inter-and transnational regulatory fora. 
Conclusions
Regulatory decisions ensuing from decision-making procedures developed at different governance levels may be interlinked in such a way that it may be artificial to ascribe them to distinct legal systems. The argument is not new. 135 Yet, hitherto, the discussion on the internationalization of EU and national administrative procedures, having highlighted the external ramifications of internal regulatory decisions, has to a large extent ignored the impact that such internationalization has on procedural guarantees that structure administrative discretion and, hence, constrain public authority exercised through general regulatory acts of varied legal nature and form. 136 Taking as a starting point the author's previous research on this matter, this article has queried whether internationalized rulemaking procedures may constitute instances of unrestrained authority and whether they may, as such, defy the premise according to which law ought to ground and limit public authority, upsetting the difficult balance between discretion and law, eventually tipping it to discretion.
Focusing only on the way decisions are formed as a result of a combination of a series of acts adopted in inter-, trans-and supranational fora -therefore isolating this aspect from posterior controls that may eventually apply -this article has argued that The procedural standards of participation that are depleted by effect of reception have the capacity to structure and constrain the exercise of authority internally. This capacity is absent in the cases of inter-and transnational decision-making analyzed.
Some of the standards depleted by effect of reception of external decisions do pertain more to administrative practice than to law. Yet, they are capable of fulfilling the function equivalent legal rules of procedure would serve in structuring and defining limits to the exercise of discretion. Notwithstanding the differences between administrative practices and legal rules, procedural standards of participation, irrespective of their origin, nature and rationale, can usefully be re-interpreted with a legal lens and redesigned accordingly. From a legal perspective, they ought to ensure the procedural protection of the legally protected interests affected by decisionmaking. They do so to the extent that, when accompanied by requirements of justification, they force the decision-makers to duly balance the public and private legally protected interests that they are bound to pursue and respect, by force of the applicable laws. In this way, procedural constraints of participation and justification can create the conditions to avoid biased decisions that potentially deny material justice.
There are varied meanings of participation, but if re-interpreted and re-designed in the way proposed, procedural standards of participation can be read in the light of the rule of law. There are also varied views on the rule of law, and the possibility that, even with this meaning, participation can be seen as a rule of law requirement is contestable. This article has endorsed a procedural conception of the rule of law, based on the work of Waldron, and moved on to argue that unrestrained authority challenges the rule of law when there are little or no guarantees of due consideration of the legally protected interests affected by decisions that result from internationalized rulemaking procedures. Lack of procedural guarantees puts at stake the dignity of the persons affected -holders of those interests are treated as objects of decisions in which they do not have a voice. It also hinders the material justice of the public acts adopted -legally protected interests are disregarded while, by law, decision-makers ought at least consider them (as well as the possible effects of their decisions) in the composition of interest that underlies decision-making. In the absence of procedural constrains that ensure due consideration for the legally protected interests affected, the conditions for biased decisions increase, as do the conditions to evade public interests that decision-makers are legally bound to pursue. This is the reason why, in the perspective defended in this article, the rule of law is challenged when procedural standards of participation are depleted that have the ability to structure discretion and constrain authority in a way that protects those values.
The construction proposed in this article would require, first, a re-interpretation of the procedural standards of participation that are currently in place not only in interand transnational procedures but also in the EU. In the EU, current procedural constraints triggered by concerns of transparency, responsiveness and accountability have the capacity of functioning as legal guarantees against unrestrained authority, or at least can be re-interpreted in this light. In the decision-making procedures analyzed, this capacity is absent at the international and transnational levels. While the EU institutional practices are closer to the transformation proposed here, approaching them from a rule of law perspective would require that they would be capable of functioning as effective constraints. This stresses the limits of current EU procedures and procedural practices. They would need to be transformed accordingly.
The effect would be creating legality (or quasi-legality) where it has not existed hitherto. The advantages and disadvantages of this transformation would need to be balanced in each regulatory setting. 
